Saturday, May 20, 2017
Sunday, May 7, 2017
Monday, April 17, 2017
Remarks from Tonga’s prime minister make public an open secret about crime in the Chinese community.
Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Tonga ‘Akilisi Pohiva has publicly said he’s concerned some members of Tonga’s Chinese community might be hiring hitmen to target rivals within their own community. In so doing, Pohiva has said out loud what is an open secret in many parts of Oceania, and beyond.
In a range of countries, some of the recently arrived Chinese immigrants are bringing with them the norms of the business sector in mainland China. Many parts of China are a wild west. There are entire “gangsterized” villages and endless examples of the impunity (and immunity) with which powerful people can act. The recent case of Bo Xilai, the former party secretary of Chongqing who became enmeshed in a murder case, shone a bit of light into the depth of the rot.
Many of the Chinese who come and work in shops in Tonga, Samoa, Fiji, and elsewhere in Oceania didn’t have much money to begin with. In Tonga’s case, many immigrants are recruited from rural areas of China by one of the handful of major Chinese business people operating in the Kingdom. Often they have to borrow either from friends, family, or illicit sources to get the money for the flights, passports, visas, and set-ups costs. All too often they end up passing through criminal emigration operations. That means some were enmeshed with corrupt, and possibly criminal, activity before even landing in Oceania. And now those organizations know where they live.
Additionally, in Tonga, newly arrived Chinese have taken over about 80 percent of the retail sector in around the last decade. Many of the Chinese who run shops are still linked back into Chinese systems through supply chains and family.
While there are notable exceptions, including intermarriage, many of the newly arrived Chinese take local citizenship if they can, but they tend to see countries like Tonga as either a place to make money before returning to China, or as a stepping stone to other countries, including New Zealand and Australia – if not for them, then for their children. Many don’t intend to set down permanent roots, and so tend not to value integration into local society.
Tonga, like much of the rest of the region, is community-based and church is important. There are regular fundraisers, sharing of crops, and food to be made for communal events. Most of the Chinese community stays outside this network of obligations.
If a Tongan owned a shop, they would be expected to contribute to the community. The Chinese don’t, lowering their operating costs (in addition to being able to source directly from contacts in China). No matter how hard a Tongan worked, it would be very difficult to compete with a Chinese shop. It is not a level playing field. This can result in resentment from the Tongan population, exacerbating insularity in the Chinese community. It is one of the reasons why Chinese shops were targeted during the Tongan riots of 2006, and why a village in Samoa has decided to ban any new Chinese shops from customary land.
The insularity of some in the Chinese community has contributed to the perpetuation of more unsavory mainland business practices. In Tonga recently arrived Chinese have been involved in human trafficking, prostitution, kidnapping and ransom, smuggling, corruption, bribery, gambling, arson, and murder. Then there is the visa fraud, fraudulent passport use, attempts to bribe customs, fencing of stolen property, etc. All in a country with a total population of around 100,000, where the Chinese population is only around 3 percent.
There isn’t much crime in Tonga, and official numbers put Chinese community-related crime at about 3 percent of total crime. But that percentage is misleading because the majority of crime within the Chinese community is never reported – it tends to be the most extreme cases, or cases involving Tongans, that find their way into the police statistics. Most adult Tongans in the capital, Nuku’alofa, can tell you where the Chinese brothels were, or are, and some of the gambling locations. They rarely get busted.
More troubling is that Tongans are sometimes enlisted as enforcers or proxies. There are multiple cases of Chinese businesspeople trying to enlist Tongans to burn down competitors’ shops, smuggle drugs, or assaultrivals within the community. This spreading of criminality into the general population is socially corrosive in the tight knit communities of Oceania. If, for example, the same China-produced fentanyl that is doing such damage in North America is brought into Oceania’s societies, it may take a very long time to recover. There are already signs meth might be making it in to Tonga.
Obviously, not all Chinese in Tonga are involved in illegal activity. In fact, some of the biggest victims of the criminality are other members of the Chinese community. Also, there are at least three distinct (though sometimes overlapping) types of crime:
- Transnational crime that passes through Tonga incidentally (for example using Tonga as a transshipment point when smuggling drugs between South America and Australia).
- Crime in Tonga with direct links back to China (possibly via organized crime groups)
- Crime within the Chinese community in Tonga
It’s unclear how much, if any, of this is linked to people in the Chinese “system,” either officially or unofficially. So, the question is how to tackle this before it gets worse?
For transnational crime, regional coordination and intelligence sharing is key. Australia and New Zealand are coordinating with other regional governments, including France, and are doing some good work in that area.
But, when it comes to domestic crime in Tonga, unfortunately New Zealand has other priorities that have seriously hampered crime prevention efforts.
Wellington has been focused on achieving a certain sort of regime change in Tonga. For at least a century various political leaders in New Zealand have been sporadically trying to break and bring to heel the complex political, economic, and social structures in Tonga. This is in part because New Zealand wants Tongan customary land, currently administered by the heads of the extended families (aka the “Nobles”), to be privatized. Some of Wellington’s recent efforts involved backing and funding, in at least one case via an NGO, the “democratic” group that was involved in the 2006 riot. During that riot, to avoid bloodshed and valuing lives over property, the Tongan police did not heavily intervene, eventually stepping aside to let the Tongan military secure the situation, which they did.
With Tonga in shock, New Zealand (and Australia) used the opening to propose a tripartite tied-aid policing agreement that would put a New Zealand police officer in place as Tonga’s Police Commissioner. Since then, three New Zealanders have filled the post. None spoke Tongan, let alone Mandarin, or had spent much time in Tonga before the posting. All have had serious problems building trust with the police force, and have forced officers to enact policies that are breaking down trust between officers and their communities, affecting information flows.
All also executed operations that raised questions about whom they were serving. One of those operations initiated a series of arrests of Nobles seemingly designed to discredit them as a group. Most of the charges were subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court, with one Noble even successfully suing for back pay owed as a result of him losing his Parliamentary seat due to the false charges. Another operation involved seizing databases from the Tongan Immigration Ministry and sending them out of the country (presumably to New Zealand) for analyses. No convictions have resulted from the seizure.
The current Police Commissioner is focused on arresting people who are sitting by the road, or in their front yard, casually drinking on a Friday or Saturday night, even if they aren’t committing (other) crimes. He’s arrested hundreds of young men. Now that they have criminal records for doing something many New Zealanders do every weekend, they will have a much harder time getting a visa for further education, work, etc.
Meanwhile, the problems in the Chinese community go unaddressed — or worse, misaddressed. At the end of March, under the watchful eye of the current New Zealander Police Commissioner, the prime minister of Tonga was made to apologize to the ambassador of China for the crimes against Chinese in Tonga. The Chinese ambassador also complained that “the reasonable compensation claims by the victims were not earnestly responded [to] or implemented.”
It’s unclear why, as the man in charge of policing, the Commissioner himself wasn’t the one to take responsibility. Rather, the Commissioner had earlier “addressed” the problem by bringing an ethnic Chinese New Zealand police officer to Tonga to act as a community liaison. A liaison between which parties was unclear as he also didn’t speak Tongan.
The Chinese ambassador gave the liaison department a car, but has yet to substantially cooperate with the Tongan government on background checks for Chinese in Tonga.
Another interesting component of the whole event was that to the ambassador, ethnicity and not citizenship was the determining factor. The ambassador, as a representative of the state of China, claimed to speak for all ethnic Chinese, regardless of whether they are from Taiwan, Fiji, or Tonga. It gives no space for a Sino-Tongan community separate from Beijing to develop.
This link between the Chinese state and overseas communities occasionally pops into high relief. For example, in 2006, there were riots in the Solomon Islands that targeted the ethnic Chinese community. Locals were incensed at what appeared to be corruption and favoritism linking Solomon Island decision-makers and some newly arrived Chinese. China evacuated hundreds of Chinese to China. Interestingly, the Solomon Islands didn’t even have official diplomatic relations with China, as it recognized Taiwan. But the perception was that the Chinese state, via its overseas community, was creating a back channel into the decision-making structure.
All this doesn’t help dispel the feeling that a large part of the Chinese community is in, but apart from, Tonga. And that, as long as China stays China, overseas communities are vulnerable, through family or business ties, to the whims of someone back on the mainland. It also inhibits ethnic Chinese from becoming more integrated into local society.
Less than two weeks later the Tongan prime minister, who seems to have better information sources than the Commissioner, couldn’t hold it in any longer and out came the comments about the hitmen.
The Tongans know what is going on, but policing directives out of Wellington are making it increasingly difficult to build the trust necessary to have the information networks required to actually do something about it. It is emblematic of an approach to the region in which some of Wellington’s “stabilizing” operations can actually create more problems for all concerned because, fundamentally, New Zealand don’t seem to trust regional allies to be able to understand and resolve their own problems. Not only does it make more difficult for the countries concerned, it can actually drive them away from wanting to cooperate in the future.
The countries of Tonga and China are working together in a range of areas. For example, soon after the apology, China announced it would be funding and building a $25 million sports complex for Tonga’s upcoming hosting of the Pacific Games.
That engagement will continue with or without the spread of crime in and around the Chinese community. It would be better for all concerned, including China, if it were without. For that to happen, New Zealand (and China) needs to get out of the way and let the Tongans assess and solve their own domestic problems, for the good of all involved.
Cleo Paskal is an Associate Fellow, Chatham House (U.K.); Visiting Trudeau Fellow, CÉRIUM (Canada); and Adjunct Faculty, Manipal University (India).
Sunday, April 16, 2017
After a relatively quiet period, Paris is re-energizing its maritime empire, particularly in the Pacific. In the past year alone, there have been huge military sales, paradigm-shifting diplomatic initiatives, and unusual visits by French political leaders to far-flung islands. The first question is why? The second question is: what does that mean in the context of China’s growing role as a Pacific maritime power?
France has impressive global reach. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, every qualifying island can claim up to a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). France has islands all over the world that qualify, including the Pacific territories of New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna.
The full tally of islands means France has the second largest EEZ in the world, around 11 million square kilometres, second only to the slightly larger EEZ of the United States. There are dots of France all over the globe, many in critical locations convenient for effective monitoring and strategic positioning.
Paris’s attitude towards her extremities tends to change over time, and is a by-product of core concerns. Take the evolving view of French Polynesia. It consists of more than 100 islands and atolls, including Tahiti and Bora Bora, spread out over the central southern Pacific and covers an enormous area, with an EEZ of 4.8 million sq km, about twenty times the total land mass of the United Kingdom.
For some of France’s post-Second World War leaders, fixated as they were with spectre of a nuclear conflict in Cold War Europe, the remoteness of the overseas territories represented a potential safe zone where leadership could retreat, and regroup. Charles de Gaulle’s concept of a ‘dispersed France’ viewed the ‘French territories in the furthest oceans’ as being crucial for the survival of the state should ‘European’ France be devastated, or become indefensible. While France decolonized other possessions, the ones in the Pacific were held on to very tightly indeed.
Tuesday, April 11, 2017
ACUNS Review of: “Global Warring: How Environmental, Economic, and Political Crises Will Redraw the World Map”
Originally appeared here.
Cleo Paskal, Global Warring: How Environmental, Economic, and Political Crises Will Redraw the World Map (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), pp. 288.
Reviewed by: Miriam Aczel (Imperial College London)
In Global Warring, Cleo Paskal describes “the ups and downs of the environment, as well as the waxing and waning of some major countries and empires” in order to assess how climate change intersects with geopolitical change (p. 18). While there is no dearth of books dedicated to addressing global climate change, Paskal’s work is unique in that it considers both the physical changes that we are likely to face as well as the resulting “geopolitical, economic, and security consequences” (p. 21). The book takes a conservative approach to modelling climate science, as she says, “eschewing the ‘Storm Surge that Will Eat Manhattan’ scenarios” (p. 9). While there is uncertainty in climate change predictions, Paskal suggests that it is now accepted by the international community that this global change is altering precipitation patterns and causing sea level rise, increased storm surge, glacial melts, and other impacts.
Paskal shows that every country is dependent on and impacted by the changing climate because our infrastructure is built to fit a specific set of climate parameters that are assumed to be constant. However, as the book demonstrates, these parameters are increasingly variable and unpredictable. Thus, it is “not surprising that changes to the environment and climate can result in crop failure, flooding, drought, and damaged infrastructure, which in turn can trigger economic, political, social, and security changes” (p. 10). Paskal discusses Hurricane Katrina’s impact on New Orleans to illustrate how poor regulations, planning, and emergency response can aggravate crises and limit the range of possible solutions. One cannot, however, say that the tragedy was caused by climate change alone.
The four main sections of the book describe a set of likely effects of climate change and the broader implications of these effects: “rising sea levels; rising storm surges; melting glaciers; and changing precipitation patterns” (18). In Part one (‘The USS Sieve: how environmental change is drilling holes in the ship of state’), Paskal analyses the surprising exposure of the US and the UK, among other countries, to projected impacts of the climate change, such as storm surges and rising sea levels. She discusses New York’s vulnerability to increasingly powerful storms; effects on drinking water; and other issues. Paskal’s warnings about the global effects of environmental change are now more relevant than ever. The analysis presented in the Global Warring, which was written in 2010, has proven to be highly accurate, as the US East Coast’s experience of super hurricane Sandy in 2012 bore out many of the book’s predictions.
Part two (‘The new geopolitical icebergs: or, how the north was lost’) examines how changes to the climate could potentially alter transportation routes and disrupt geopolitical strategies and economic models. With the melting of Arctic sea ice, the Northwest Passage may become one of the most sought-after trade routes. Western attention is currently focused on resource extraction: oil, gas, and fish. But as new northern transportation passages open, the focus will likely shift from resource development to competition over shipping routes. An opening of the Passage has the potential to compromise security among countries fighting for its control. Pascal says that currently the U.S. is concerned primarily with the commercial value of Arctic’s resources and is not paying enough attention to the security issues, thus “causing problems with longtime loyal allies” (p. 110).
The book’s third part (‘Precipitating change in Asia and beyond: how China, India, and the West are trying to make friends in interesting times’) looks at the alterations of precipitation patterns and at how such changes could potentially result in “internal disruptions and affect geopolitical relationships” for countries such as India and China (20). Paskal examines the long history of development of civilization on the Asian continent. She notes that “the temperamental land…takes as well as gives” (p. 130). Paskal uses an example of positive and negative human impact on the Fertile Crescent, where the Sumerians controlled floods for irrigation. The Sumerians changed the landscape and climate with overpopulation and poor farming methods that in turn led to problems such as “inflation, over-taxation, unemployment, famine, revolts, war, anarchy, and disease” (p. 131). Paskal says that evidence is emerging on global patterns of irregular precipitation, which leads to wildfires, crop failures, ice storms, and floods. Environmental degradation has dramatic physical, social, and political impacts. Paskal cites the examples of China and India as growing powerhouses, but makes the case that their success depends on their effective management of resources and environmental change. She concludes the chapter by saying that we face a new time of rapid change and scarce resources. These factors compel nations “to build strong, multifaceted networks that supply them with needed resources and geopolitical backing” (p. 186).
In the final section of the book (‘The turbulent Pacific: how rising sea levels could wash away whole countries and swamp the global ship of state’), Paskal looks at how the rising sea levels could impact resource access. She also examines China’s ability to project power, particularly in the Pacific, which is “a geostrategic buffer zone between Asia and the United States” (p. 20). Paskal explains that, notwithstanding the ecological and human impacts of the rising sea levels, there will be two different types of Pacific islands: those that “sink and become potential shipping hazards” and those that “stay above water and become potential geostrategic commercial and military bases” (p. 234). International politics will likely play a larger role in determining what parts of the ocean belong to which nation. Finally, the author advises that there is a possibility that “in a chaotic future of environmental change, where laws are unclear and power is in flux,” countries that seek stability, influence, access to important resources, and control of shipping routes will need to begin planning for such drastic changes (p. 235).
Paskal concludes by assessing different national adaptation programs to determine which of these are the most likely to remain robust during periods of national and international flux. She recommends that to “understand real weaknesses, one has to break down the challenge into more manageable components…to formulate what must be done to enhance stability in a crisis” (p. 239). Using this assessment approach, Paskal proposes a three-stage framework for mitigation of social, political, and security impacts of a crisis. The framework is based on the following stages: “Reinforce (prepare before the crisis); Rescue (manage systems and services during a crisis); and Recover (develop long-term strategy for recovery)” (p. 239). Each mitigation stage “operates at four levels: government, society (including non-profits), the private sector, and the media” (p. 239). In a clearly presented table, Paskal enumerates specific recommendations at each stage for these four levels (p. 241).
Paskal further recommends that “geopolitically we [nations] will all need more, and varied, friends” (p. 247). She explains that “prepar[ations] for environmental change will take political will, good basic engineering, public education, long-term planning, and sustained funding,” (p. 249). This book presents a strong case for why these preparations are necessary and provides clear recommendations for how to better develop our response to the crisis.
Paskal’s book demonstrates that climate change will have a huge impact, not just physical and climactic, but also economic, geopolitical, and security related. She succeeds in presenting a strong and well-researched case about the impacts that will affect everyone around the globe. Paskal also provides a projection of what may occur in the future so that we may have a better chance to plan for it, rather than be left “huddling under a broken umbrella when the monsoon comes” (p. 21).
Wednesday, March 15, 2017
Wednesday, February 15, 2017
Saturday, January 14, 2017
Trump seems not to believe in monsters. Or, to put it in another way, Trump thinks he and America are the biggest ‘monsters’ on the map.
Wednesday, January 4, 2017
Saturday, December 31, 2016
Tuesday, December 6, 2016
Cleo Paskal was on Background Briefing with Ian Masters talking about policy priorities for soon to be President Trump. You can hear it here.